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1) Introduction
For many years it was government policy in Egypt to provide employment for graduates in the public sector. There are many studies on the causes and consequences of this policy. This policy was abandoned in the early 1990s. Further, the public sector employment is being retrenched in Egypt since the early 1990s due to extensive privatizations. The competitive labor market paradigm does not relate to the public sector employment. The working conditions, retirement provisions and other benefits are thought to be better in the public sector than in the private sector. For this reason, public versus private sector wage gap is of utmost importance to the policy makers. Further, public sector pay is believed to influence the private sector pay.
Institutional characteristics may influence the public and private sector pay gap. They may include the minimum wage, wage indexation, employment protection legislation and strength of unionization. Such institutional factors may not be relevant for the Egyptian labor market.
However, the level of centralization of the public sector is strong in Egypt.
Recently, Assaad (1997) and Said (2015) have investigated the earnings in the public sector in Egypt. However, this is the first study that explicitly investigates the public versus private earnings differential in Egypt using panel data which is rare in developing countries.
We examine the cases of females and males separately during the 1998-2012 period using the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey. We estimate Mincer wage equations both at the mean and at different quantiles of the wage distribution taking into account observable and unobservable characteristics with a fixed effects model. We first provide an application of quantile regression of the wage equations with sample selection correction. Upon finding that there is very little evidence of sample selection in our data we then turn to further estimates without sector selection correction. We find a persistent public sector wage penalty for males and public sector wage premium for females. They are larger when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account for males but insignificant for females. They are similar across the quantiles for males but, smaller at the top than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution for females. In addition, we also examine the public versus private sector earnings differential over time as well as for the different sub-groups of the population according to age, education and region of residence. The public sector wage penalty for males has decreased recently over time and is larger for the better educated and younger. There are also significant regional differences. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of literature. A brief background on Egyptian labor market is provided is Section 3. Section 4 explains the data used and the descriptive evidence. The methodology and the empirical strategy followed are described in Section 5. Estimation results with sample selection correction are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents the estimation results without the sample selection correction.
Concluding remarks appear in Section 8. Gregory and Borland (1999) provide a thorough review of literature on public sector labor markets. The vast majority of the public-earnings gap literature concentrates on crosssectional differences in wages. Most studies also address the non-random sector selection. Such studies include Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) and van Ophem (1993) for the Netherlands, Lassibille (1998) for Spain, Dustmann and van Soest (1998) and Melly (2005) for Germany, Disney and Gosling (2003) for the UK, Tansel (2005) for Turkey and Bargain and Melly (2008) for France. Lucifora and Meurs (2006) measure and decompose public-private earnings differences in the UK, France and Italy. For France and Italy they conclude that in the private sector the use of collective bargaining and union power are substantial. This results in a pay setting system based heavily on rewarding observable characteristics such as education and experience. This can explain the substantial part of public sector earnings gap. Their results of quantile regression analysis is similar to Melly's findings for Germany. They find that as one moves up the earnings distribution, the proportion of the pay gap explained by observable factors increases. In contrast, in the lower quantiles differences in unobserved characteristics are more important in explaining pay differences. Similar results for France and Italy are also found by Ghinetti and Lucifora (2007) using European Community Household Panel data from the 2001 wave. Van Ophem (1993) uses functional form assumptions to deal with the sector selection issue. Dustmann and van Soest (1998) and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) use an instrumental variables approach. Further they consider only cross-sectional differences in instantaneous earnings between the public and private sectors. Cappellari (2002) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) are the only studies that address differences in earnings dynamics between the public and private sectors. Capellari uses a panel of Italian administrative data and assumes exogenous selection of individuals into sectors. He also contributes on empirical models of income dynamics and study of lifetime income inequality. Heitmueller and Mavromaras (2007) study the public-private sector pay gap in Germany in the 1990s. They find that throughout the 1990s the pay gap remained stable in the West and increased considerably in the East which is an indication of the public sector crowding out the private sector in the East.
2) Brief Review of Literature
Dell 'Aringa, et al. (2007) investigate regional public-private wage gap in Italy using geographically weighted regressions. They find that the pay gap can be partly explained by local labor market conditions affecting the private sector and only marginally the public sector.
The regional pay gaps are found to explain regional imbalances in terms of 'wait' unemployment and regional recruitment problems. Garcia-Perez and Jimeno (2007) also investigate wage differences among regions using data from the European Community Household Panel for the period 1995-2001. They find that the public sector wage gaps vary across gender, educational levels and occupations. Cai and Liu (2011) examine the public-private wage gap along the wage distribution employing quantile regressions. The pay gaps decrease monotonically and are negative at the top half of the distribution for males while pay premiums are relatively stable across the distribution for females. Giordano et al. (2011 Giordano et al. ( ) use the 2004 Giordano et al. ( -2007 SILC data for 10 European Union countries. They find a public sector premium in most countries. Campos and Centeno (2012) analyze the evolution of public wages and the public-private wage gaps in several European countries using fixed effects quantile regressions. They find that the public-private pay gap increased in the 1990's favoring the public sector employees compared to private sector employees with the same observable and unobservable characteristics. Siminski (2013) investigates the public-private wage gap for Australia across the wage distribution with significant premium for women but not for men. He finds that the compressed wage profile of the public sector induces the best workers (on unobserved skills) to join the public sector in both high and low wage occupations. Christofides and Michael (2013) estimate the public versus private pay gap for 27 European countries using the 2008 SILC data. They account for selectivity and decompose into explained and unexplained components. The QR estimates show that public-private wage gap is generally larger at the bottom than at the top of the wage distribution. Nikolic (2014) investigates the public-private pay gap in Serbia with significant changes over the 1995-2008 period. He finds negative pay gaps at early stages of economic transition but positive ones during large-scale privatizations. Lausev (2014) surveys the literature on public-private pay gap in transitioning countries of Eastern Europe and compares the results with those from developed countries. He finds public sector pay penalties during the period of economic transition from a communist to market-based economy as compared to zero or positive pay gap in developed economies. He also concludes that the competition for workers is the major cause of the systematic pay differences between the two sectors.
Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014) study the public-private pay gap in Greece.
They find a large public premium which is mostly accounted for by self-selection into the sector that rewards better their characteristics for men, while it is due to public-private differences in returns for women. Depalo et al. (2015) consider the euro-area and provide quantile decompositions. Hospido and Moral-Benito (2016) examine the Spanish pay gap utilizing data from tax records. They find a public sector premium which also varies along the wage distribution after accounting for characteristics and endogenous selection. Mahuteau et al. (2017) examine the case in Australia using a panel data quantile regression with fixed effects controlling for observable and un-observable factors. They find a public sector premium which is slightly higher for females than for males. This impact is larger at the lower end of the wage distribution than at other parts. Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) and Tansel et al. (2015) provide a recent review of the Egyptian economy and the labor market. This section will give a brief overview of the Egyptian public and private labor market. According to the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 2012, the government employment is about 24 percent among men and 12 percent among women. According to recent statistics public sector employs 27 percent of all workers and 44 percent of the wage earners (Amin, 2014) . Women out of the labor force are substantial. About 10 percent of men and 72 percent of women are out of labor force (Tansel and Ozdemir, 2014) .
3) Egyptian Public and Private Labor Markets
During the past two decades substantial labor retrenchment took place in the public sector.
Therefore, the government employment opportunities have been declining recently. Public administration lost about 40,000 jobs during the (World Bank, 2014 . However, government employment is a more attractive employment option in particular for women than private sector jobs. Individual self-employment and employment in household enterprises constituted more than a third of overall employment in 2006. Nearly half of private sector wage employment was in micro enterprises of fewer than five workers (Said, 2009) . Therefore, informal employment is rather large with strong segmentation as noted by Gatti et al. (2014) . Tansel et al. (2015) find large informal sector penalty in earnings vis-à-vis the formal sector in Egypt.
Female labor force participation is very low in Egypt. It was 23.1 percent for females and 80.2 percent for males in 2012 (Assaad and Krafft, 2013) . The 15-29 year olds constitute about a quarter of the total labor force. Unemployment rate was about 12.6 percent in 2016 and higher for females than for males (CAPMAS, 2014) . Almost over 75 percent of the unemployed was 15-29 years old implying an unemployment problem for the youth. The unemployment rate is also rather high among the highly educated (Assaad and Krafft, 2013) .
Thus, although their labor force participations are very low, women and the young exhibit high unemployment rates. Labor legislation mainly effects small number of wage and salary workers in the private formal sector, civil servants and public sector. Labor law in Egypt might be considered rigid de jure, by international standards but, they are not enforced de facto (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo, 2011). Thus enforcement remains weak (Lohmann, 2010) . The trade union membership is weak (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo, 2011). The trade union density rate in 2007 as a proportion of total employment was 16.1 and as a proportion of wage and salary earners was 26.1. Collective bargaining coverage in the private sector is limited. The minimum wage law is effective only in the public sector. It was adjusted twice recently; in 2012 for the first time since the 1980's and then in 2014.
Recently, there was a trend toward greater formalization in private wage employment (Said, 2009) . However informal employment has increased recently due to the privatization along with a decline in public sector employment opportunities and the introduction of the 2003 Labor Law. The 2003 Labor Law brought more flexibility in employment relations which is believed to cause an increase in informal employment yet at the same time contributed to formalization since then (Wahba and Assaad, 2015) . However, World Bank (2014) notes a recent increase in informality across nearly every industry and at all education categories for men. Assaad (2009) and Said (2009) express concern about recent high unemployment rate among the university graduates. Their another concern is the recent declining participation rates of educated females who drop out of the labor force when discouraged due to lack of government employment opportunities
4) The Data and the Descriptive Evidence
This study is based on the longitudinal survey of Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey Assaad and Krafft (2013) extensively. They note that the attrition was mostly random from 1998 to 2006 but "complex in nature" from 2006 to 2012. They correct for the attrition using nonresponse weighs which are computed with observable characteristics of individuals and households. These weights are used to adjust for the attrition in the descriptive statistics in Table 1- mechanisms differ vastly across public and private sectors. In order to make the public and the private sector samples comparable in terms of their non-monetary remunerations we consider the formal private sector wage-earners and ignore informal private sector wage earners. The sectors are defined such that they are comparable along a number of dimensions. We define formal private sector (henceforth private sector) as those wage earners who are covered by the social security through their employment and/or who have an employment contract. Our definition of public (or government) sector (henceforth public sector) excludes public enterprise workers. In the data set the mean log hourly wage of public enterprise workers is 1.73 while that of the government employees is 1.53. Their difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. Therefore public enterprise workers are excluded in order not to confound the results.
Male and female samples are analyzed separately. The labor force participation of women in Egypt is very low. Most of the women are either inactive or work as unpaid family workers (Tansel and Ozdemir, 2014) . Therefore, the issues of women's selection both into employment and the public-private sector are important to address. This is not a standard econometric procedure in the QR framework. We address the sector selection issue in our QR estimation. Further, the number of female observations in the private sector is rather small. Therefore, in the following sections some of the estimation procedures are not performed for the female sample. In such cases we report and comment on the estimates only for the male sample. For males in 1998 private sector Kernel density stands slightly to the right of the public sector density indicating some public sector penalty in the middle of the distribution. In 2012 the public sector Kernel density stands slightly to the right of the private sector density indicating some public sector premium.
Tables 1-a-b-c-d gives the descriptive statistics for the female and male samples in the public and private sectors for 1998, 2006, 2012 and for the pooled sample respectively. The figures in these tables are adjusted for attrition. the In Table 1 -a for 1998, female log hourly wage in the public sector is higher than that of the male while in the private sector male log hourly wage is higher than that of the female. Further, male mean log hourly wage is higher in the private than in the public sector while opposite hold true for the female log hourly wage. The female log hourly wage in the public sector is higher than in the private sector. In 2006 the mean log hourly wages are higher than in 1998 and the standard deviations are also higher. This implies higher wage inequality in 2006 compared to in 1998. The relative sizes of the public versus private sector mean log hourly wages are similar to those observed in 1998. In 2012 the mean log hourly wages are higher than in 2006. The standard deviations of log hourly wages in 2012 is less than that in 2006.This implies smaller wage inequality in 2012 compared to in 2006. In the public sector, contrary to that in 1998 and 2006, the male mean log hourly wage is higher than that of the female. In the private sector, similar to 1998 and 2006, the male mean log hourly wage is higher than that of the female. Further, for males contrary to that in 1998 and 2006, male mean log hourly wage in the public sector is higher than that of in the private sector.
Similar to that observed in 1998 and 2006, the female log hourly wage in the public sector is higher than that in the private sector.
Finally the Table 1-d gives the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. For men the mean log hourly wage is larger in the private sector than in the public sector while the reverse is true for women where the mean log hourly wage is substantially larger in the public sector then in the private sector. These indicate a public sector penalty for men but a public sector premium for women. We comment on the rest of the variable in Table 1 -d. The weekly hours of work is substantially larger in the private sector than in the public sector especially for females. Both females and males are substantially older in the public than in the private sector. In both the public and private sectors, women are better educated than men since the female years of schooling are larger than that of males in both sectors. Further, men are somewhat better educated in the public than in the private sector whereas females are equally well educated in both sectors. A larger percentage of both females and males in public sector are married than in the private sector. Similarly, a larger percentage of both females and males in the public sector have children. The Rural Upper region has the least percent of female public employees.
Nearly half of the female private sector employees are in the Greater Cairo region. As remarked earlier, the total number of female observations in the private sector is rather small. This has created problems in some estimation procedures.
Above explanations refer to the raw differences between the public versus private sectors.
However, the compositional differences in the characteristics of public versus private sector employment are important. For the public sector the educational threshold is higher.
Employment entry age is also higher. There is greater representation of women in the public than in the private sector. In the rest of this paper we consider the pay gap by controlling for the compositional differences between the public and private sectors.
 Insert Tables 1-a-b-c-d about here 

5) Conceptual Framework and the Econometric Methodology
Recently panel data became available in many developing countries. In particular, with the panel data, estimation of fixed effect (FE) model, that is purging of the effect of unobservable characteristics became possible. The FE estimation deals with the issue of unobservable characteristics providing consistent estimates assuming that un-observables are time invariant. A number of researchers followed this route in studying wage differential between formal versus informal sectors both at the mean and at various quantiles. They include, Tansel and Kan (2012) in Turkey, Nguyen et al. (2013) in Vietnam, Bargain and Kwenda (2014) in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, Tansel et al. (2015) in Egypt and Nordman et al. (2016) in Madagaskar. A common finding is that sectoral earnings differentials either get smaller or disappear in these countries when unobservable worker characteristics are controlled for with FE estimation exploiting the panel feature of the data. Mahuteau et al. (2017) for Australia address the public versus private wage differential employing panel data with a FE model both at the mean and across the wage distribution. None of these studies addressed the issue of sector of employment selection as we consider in this paper.
Earlier studies in the literature on the sectoral earnings differentials focused on estimation at the mean of the earnings distribution. There may be important differentials along the earnings distribution due to intrinsic heterogeneity in jobs. This is ignored when only the differential at the mean is considered. Recently, researchers addressed the heterogeneity that may exist along the earnings distribution by using QR technique in various contexts. For example, Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in Brazil provided estimates along the earnings distribution in the context of formal versus informal sectors. However, while employing QR estimation addressing of the estimation problems such as unobserved heterogeneity or sector selection becomes difficult. The techniques to deal with these problems are theoretically well developed and available but their implementation are rare. Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) adopt the QR technique corrected for self-selection using instrumental variables (IV) with a cross-sectional data set in Brazil. Tansel et. al. (2015) in Egypt, Nguyen et al. (2013) in Vietnam, Bargain and Kwenda (2014) in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa and Mahuteau et al. (2017) in Australia adopt a fixed effect model estimation with QR technique (FEQR).
Instrumental variable (IV) methods could be useful in addressing the sector selection issues and in order to obtain causal estimates. However, a suitable instrumental variable could not be found in the ELMPS. Therefore, in this paper this method is not employed. We address the sample selection issue that influences the decision to seek public sector employment.
We first estimate several models with sample selection correction. First, we use the standard Heckman selection correction with a probit sector of employment selection in the first stage and an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) public and private wage equations in the second stage. Second, we estimate Fixed Effects (FE) model at the mean with sample selection. Third, we estimate a QR model with sample selection correction. Unfortunately, we cannot carry out a Fixed Effects Quantile Regression (FEQR) model with sample selection correction, because to the best of our knowledge the theoretical developments in the estimation of this model is not treated.
In our estimates of various models with sample selection correction, presented in Section 4.1, we find that the sample selection term is mostly statistically insignificant. This indicates that the non-random sample selection between public and private sectors is not important in our data. In the face of this finding our preferred estimates are those without sample selection correction. These estimates include utilization of OLS, FE, QR and FEQR techniques.
They are explained in Section 4.2. The conceptual framework is based on the Mincer earnings equation. It is estimated with a dummy variable indicator for the public sector. Namely, we consider the earnings gap for the two sectors and ascertain whether this gap favors public sector or the private sector. We carry out the estimations at the mean of the wage distribution and at various quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. In this process we employ the OLS, FE QR and FEQR techniques.
5.1) Models with Sample Selection Correction
Heckman two-step method involves two steps. In the first step we estimate a simple probit model for the probabilities of workers selecting public or the private sector. In the first step we estimate the probit equation by maximum likelihood method and compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). In the second step we estimate the wage offer equation by OLS by including the IMR as an additional variable. Our second set of estimates are FE estimates with sample selection correction. In this process we use the panel feature of the data. We first estimate a panel probit model and compute the IMR. In this process we use a Random Effects (RE) model.
In the estimation of the wage equation, we perform a Hausmann test of whether FE or RE estimation is suitable. The test results indicated that FE model is preferable. Therefore, in the second step we estimate a FE model of the wage equation expanded with IMR .
Our third set of estimates are QR estimates with sample selection correction. There are very few applications of this method. We have located the applications by Buchinski (2001), Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) , Huber and Melly (2011) and Coelho et.al. (2008) . The method is developed by Buchinsky (1998) based on non-parametric method. This is a variant of the standard Heckman two-step estimation method developed for the mean regression by Heckman (1979) and extended by Newey (1999) . In the first step, we use a model similar to probit model for sector selection but rather than assuming normality we use the semi-parametric method developed by Ichimura (1993) called Semi-Parametric Least Squares (SLS). The estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal.
Following Buchinsky (1998) , in the second step the quantile wage equation is expanded with power series expansion of IMR in order to control for sector selection. Details of this procedure are given in Buchinski (1988; 2001) and Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto. We provide a summary of this procedure in Appendix-B.
5.2) Models without Sample Selection Correction
The OLS model is estimated on a sample of pooled panel observations of individual-
year pairs as follows.
We correct the standard errors to reflect the fact that we use observations from the same person are used two or three times. Next we use panel feature of the data and estimate a FE model where we control for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. The FE estimator is consistent as long as unobserved characteristics are constant over time. The FE model is specified as follows.
In models (1) and (2) it y is log hourly wages, it x is the vector of control variables for individual i at time t including a constant, it I is a dummy variable taking a value one if the wage earner is in the public sector at time t. The private sector worker is the base category.
 is a normally, independently and identically distributed stochastic error term with zero conditional mean. The estimated  measures the public employment penalty/premium.
Next we investigate the public sector wage penalty/premium along the conditional wage distribution using QR. The standard QR method is then extended to using panel data and we estimate the FEQR model. Estimating the QR models are especially important since the conditional earnings differentials across different quantiles proxy for unobservable earnings potential. The QR and FEQR models can be written as in equations (3) and (4) as follows respectively. Upper. The base region is Greater Cairo. Table 2 presents the probit and panel probit estimates of employment sector selection.
6) Estimation Results with Sample Selection Correction
These are first stage estimates. Using these results we subsequently present the selectivity corrected wage equation estimates in Table 3 by including IMR as an additional variable. In the second step QR models with selection correction are estimated. The IMR polynomials from the first stage SLS estimates are included as additional regressors. Table 5 for females and And about 6 % for males which is somewhat lower than for females in both the public and private sectors. A common finding in several studies indicate that public sector wage premium is larger at the low end of the wage distribution than at the top end of the wage distribution. For instance Birch (2006) and Cai and Liu (2011) find this for Australia with QR estimates. They also find public sector penalty for men at the top of the wage distribution. Another general finding is that public sector premium is larger for women and workers with low pay. Similar to our results Vella (1993) and Siminsky (2013) find in Australia a premium for women but no statistically significant difference for men while Cai and Liu (2011) find a premium for women and a penalty for men similar to our results for Egypt.
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition:
7.2) Results for Various Sub-Samples
Results by Education
The estimation results of the public sector gap for various levels of education are given in Table 9 for the male sample. Estimates for the female sample cannot be performed due to  Insert Table 9 about here  For the subsample of less educated where the years of schooling is less than the mean years of schooling of the sample the FE public sector wage gap is not statistically significant. The FEQR estimates all of the quantiles indicate statistically significant public sector penalty of declining magnitude across the quantiles. For the subsample of better educated where the years of schooling is greater than the mean years of schooling of the sample the FE public sector penalty is statistically significant and is about 35 percent. The FEQR estimates are all statistically significant and range between 30-37 percent. We can conclude that the public sector penalty for the better educated is much larger than for the less educated.
 Insert Table 10 about here 
Results by Age and Time Periods
The results by age are given in Table 10 for the male sample. We consider age as a proxy for experience. We consider two subsamples of less experienced where the age is less than the mean age and the subsample of better experienced where the age is greater than the mean age of the sample. There is statistically significant public sector penalty except in the FE estimate for the old sample. For the young the FE penalty is about 35 percent. The FEQR estimates are relatively stable across the quantiles. For the old the FE estimate is not statistically significant. The FEQR estimates are all statistically significant and somewhat increase across quantiles. The FEQR estimates show that the penalty range between 19-22 percent across the quantiles.
We can conclude that the public sector penalty is lower for the more recent period implying a decline in penalty over time.
Results by Region
Public sector pay gap across the regions of a country is addressed in several studies. For instance, Dell'Aringa et al. (2007) for Italy, Garcia-Perez and Jimenez (2007) for Spain and Heitmuller and Mavromaras (2007) for Germany addressed the regional public-private sector pay issues. Public sector pay is uniform across regions in Egypt due to strong central government. Therefore, the observed penalty we discuss below, is a result of the differentials across the regions in the private sector pay. Table 11 presents the average log hourly wages by gender and region. We observe that in all of the regions the average log hourly wages for females is lower than that of males. In the male sample the average log hourly wage is highest in Greater Cairo and lowest in Rural Lower.
In the female sample the average log hourly wage is also highest in Greater Cairo but lowest in Rural Upper. we provide one of the few applications of the QR model with sample selection correction. We also present the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at the mean and at different quantiles. Returns to education are somewhat larger for females than for males. They decrease across quantiles for females and it is similar across the quantiles for males.
Our results for the selectivity corrected wage equations lead us to conclude that sector selection is not significant in our data. Therefore, for the rest of our study we investigate the public sector wage gap without sector selection correction. Making use of the panel feature of the data we estimate FE and FEQR whereby we take into account both the observable and the unobservable characteristics. We find significant gender differences. Our findings indicate a persistent public sector wage penalty for males and public sector wage premium for females in several alternative estimates. The public sector wage penalty for males is larger when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account but the public sector wage premium for females becomes insignificant when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. The premium we find for women may be due to gender equality in pay in the public sector in Egypt and large pay discrimination for women in the private sector. The quantile regression estimates give an idea about the extent of the penalty or premium across the conditional wage distribution. The penalties for males are similar across the quantiles while premiums for females are smaller at the top than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution. A comparison of QR and FEQR estimates imply that high paid male workers are more able in the private sector than in the public sector. A comparison of the OLS and FE estimates for men (where FE penalty is larger than the OLS) imply that private sector workers are more able than the public sector workers.
Similar comparison for women (where OLS premium disappears with FE) implies that public sector workers are more able than those in the private sector. One implication is that given the finding of penalty for males and premium for females policy makers should set the severance payments accordingly.
We further examine the public sector wage penalty for males in different sub-samples according to education, age and time period. These subsample estimates provide interesting insight about the structure of the wages in the public and private sectors. The public sector wage penalty for males is larger for the better educated and the younger and has decreased recently over time. We also find substantial regional differences in public sector wage gap for males.
The highest penalty is at region Urban Lower. This is followed by Rural Lower. The Rural
Upper exhibits the lowest public sector penalty among all of the regions.
This study provides valuable information about the workings of the labor markets in the public and private sectors in Egypt. The analysis provides information about factors that underline the earnings differentials between these sectors. An understanding of these observable and unobservable factors will be useful for providing policy relevant guidelines for the administrators in the public sector employment and for the leaders of the private sector employment in Egypt. ELMPS data, 1998 ELMPS data, , 2006 ELMPS data, , 2012 Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
2) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 3) Panel Probit are perform with Random Effects Probit Model, we also tested whether FE or RE model is to be preferred. However, could not perform FE Probit model with our panel data. Therefore, panel probit estimates are from RE model. Sources: Authors' computations using ELMPS data, 1998 ELMPS data, , 2006 ELMPS data, , 2012 Notes:1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
2) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 1998, 2006, 2012. Notes:1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
2) We also included the sector of work, regions and year dummies. But, the estimates did not convergence in this case. Therefore, they are excluded. Sources: Authors' computations using ELMPS data, 1998 ELMPS data, , 2006 ELMPS data, , 2012 Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis, 100 replications. Sources: Authors' computations using ELMPS data, 1998 Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
2) OLS indicates ordinary least squares estimates. QR indicates quantile regression estimates. FE is fixed effect estimates. FEQR is the fixed effect quantile regression estimates. OLS and FE standard errors are robust and QR and FEQR standard errors are computed by bootstrap method 100 replications.
3) Regression coefficients on the table are based on the regressions reported in Appendix A, Tables A2-A5. 3) The standard errors for FE are robust and those of FEQR are computed by bootstrap method, 100 replications. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 Public wage gap -0.2639*** -0.2976*** -0.2779*** -0.2192*** -0.2707*** (0.0349) (0.0157) (0.0000) (0.0192) (0.0296) Age 0.0108 0.0351*** 0.0498*** 0.0570*** 0.0796*** (0.0079) (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0084) Age Squared 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) Year of Schooling 0.0022 0.0009 0.0026*** 0.0041*** 0.0061** (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0 ,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 Sources: Authors' computations using ELMPS data, 1998 Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
APPENDIX-A
2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis, 100 replications.
APPENDIX-B
Sample Selection Correction in Quantile Regression Model
In this appendix we present the sample selection correction method in a quantile regression model. In the presentation below we use the same notation as Buchinski (1998; 2001) and Pianto and Pianto (2002) and summarize the discussion in these references. This method is a variant of the standard Heckman two-step procedure used to control for sample selectivity. It is similar to that previously suggested by Heckman (1979) and extended by Newey (1999) for the mean regression. It is introduced by Buchinsky (1998) and based on a nonparametric correction method. As usual there are two stages. In the first step, we use a simple probit model to estimate the probabilities of workers being in the public or private sector. However, we don't want to impose the restriction of normality. Therefore, a semi-parametric method which is developed by Ichimura (1993) is used. This makes no assumptions about the distribution of the residuals.
We now summarize the steps involved.
First, a binary variable di and a latent or index variable g for public versus private sector selection are defined as follows:
1: 0, sector 0 : 0, sector
The likelihood of a person i working in the public sector is given by the following equation where i x is a set of personal characteristics:
In the second step, we write a public wage offer equation as a quantile regression as follows: 
